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Abstract 
When enterprises deploy multiple firewalls, a packet may be 
examined by different sets of firewalls.   It has been observed that 
the resulting complex firewall network is highly error prone and 
causes serious security holes. Hence, automated solutions are 
needed in order to check its correctness.  In this paper, we 
propose a formal and automatic method for checking whether 
multiple firewalls react correctly with respect to a security policy 
given in a high level declarative language. When errors are 
detected, some useful feedback is returned in order to correct the 
firewall configurations. Furthermore, we propose a priority-based 
approach to ensure that no incoherencies exist within the security 
policy.  We show that our method is both correct and complete. 
Finally, it has been implemented in a prototype of verifier based 
on a satisfiability solver modulo theories. Experiment conducted 
on relevant case studies demonstrates the efficiency of our 
approach. 
. 
Keywords: network security, distributed firewall configuration, 
formal verification, SMT solver. 
1. Introduction 
Firewalls are the most widely adopted technology for 
protecting private networks. Placed, generally, at the point 
of entry between public network and private network zones, 
a firewall ensures the access control of the forwarding 
traffic. However, according to the study undertaken by 
Wool [15], most firewalls in Internet are plagued with 
policy errors. The main firewall configuration constraint is 
that the filtering rules of a firewall configuration FC file 
are treated in the order in which they are read in the 
configuration file, in a switch-case fashion. For instance, if 
two filtering rules associate different actions to the same 
flow type, then only rule with the lower order is really 
applied. This is in contrast with the security policy SP, 
which is a set of rules considered without order. In this 
case, the action taken, for the flow under consideration, 
can be the one of the non-executed rule. The following 
example illustrates how easily firewall mis-configurations 
can happen: 
 
Table 1: Firewall Configuration Error 
 src_adr dst adr protocol  dst_port action 
r1 
 
214.0.0.0/8  
 
* tcp * accept 
r2 214.65.0.0/16  
 
* tcp 445 deny 
 
The second rule is configured to deny all the outbound 
traffic to a known backdoor TCP port for the sasser worm 
Which is conform to a specific SP . But even if this rule is 
correct by itself, the firewall will accept this flow type 
because it matches the rule before. In this case, r1 shadows 
 r2 and leaves the hole wide open. A correct configuration 
according to this specific SP could be a swap of the two 
rules. 
As shown by Chapman [18], safely configuring firewall 
rules has never been an easy task. Since, firewall 
configurations are low-level files, subject to special 
configuration constraints in order to ensure an efficient real 
time processing by specific devices. Whereas, the security 
policy SP , used to express global security requirements, is 
Generally specified in high-level declarative language easy 
to understand. Hence, this makes verifying the 
conformance of a firewall configuration FC to a security 
policy SP a daunting task. Particularly, when it is to 
analyze the impact of the inter-actions of a large number of 
rules on the behavior of a firewall. Moreover, when large 
enterprise deploy multiple firewalls to manage internal 
traffic between private zones due to the growing number of 
internal attacks,  a packet from the same source to the same 
destination may be examined by different sets of firewalls.  
It is so even more difficult to check whether all these sets 
of firewalls satisfy the end-to-end security policies of the 
enterprise. 
Several methods have been proposed [14], [2], [4], [1], [3], 
 [24], [21] for the detection of inter-rule conflicts in FC. 
These work are limited to the problem conflict avoidance, 
and do not consider the more general problem of verifying 
whether a firewall reacts correctly with respect to a given 
  
SP. Solutions are studied in [11], [7], [16], [23], [13] for 
the analysis of firewalls’ behavior. These methods require 
some final user interactions by sending queries through a 
verification tool. Such manual solutions can be tedious 
when checking discrepancies with respect to complicated 
security requirements. In [5],[12] and [10] the authors 
address the problem of automatic verification by providing 
automatic translation tool of the security requirements (SP), 
specified in a high level language, into a set of ordered 
filtering rules (i.e. a FC). Therefore, these methods can 
handle the whole problem of conformance of FC to SP, but 
the validity of the compilation itself has not been proved. 
In particular, the FC rules obtained may be in conflict. In 
our previous work [19], we proposed to verify the 
correctness of a single firewall configuration according to 
a given SP. In this paper, we consider the more general and 
complex case by proposing an automatic method for 
checking whether a distributed firewall is well configured 
according to a global security policy, given in an 
expressive enough declarative language. Furthermore, the 
proposed method ensures conflicts avoidance within the 
SP that we aim to establish and returns key elements for 
the correction of flawed firewall configurations. Our 
method has been implemented as a prototype which can be 
used either in order to validate an existing distributed FC 
with respect to a given SP or downstream of a compiler of 
SP. It can also be used in order to assist the updates of a 
distributed FC, since some conflicts may be created by the 
addition or deletion of filtering rules. The work of Liu and 
Gouda [17] is similar to ours in spirit. However, their 
solution is applied for one specific security property and 
considered exactly one possible path from a source to a 
destination zone. As shown above, it seems necessary to 
assume that all paths are topologically possible for 
ensuring the correctness of proposed algorithms. Besides 
that, routing is designed to be adaptive to link failures and 
heavy load. In addition, it is relatively easy to inject 
routing messages [22]. In other hand, strengths compared 
to their work consist on : First, proving the correctness and 
the completeness of our method and second, giving key 
elements with high level granularity to help the correction 
of firewall mis-configurations which should be the main 
and the concrete target of such study. 
2. Security Policy 
2.1 Formal Specification 
A security policy (SP) is a finite set of security directives 
defining whether packets are accepted or denied: SP = {sdi 
⇒ Ai |[ei ] | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each security directive can be 
simple or complex. A simple directive {sdi ⇒ Ai} 
describes whether some traffic destined to one or more 
services that are required by one or more sources and 
given by one or more destinations (as described by the 
condition sdi ) must be accepted or refused (according to Ai 
∈ {accept, deny}). A complex directive {sdi ⇒ Ai |ei} is 
basically a simple directive with some additional 
exceptions defined in ei . In our previous work [19], we 
consider only one exception in our verification process. 
The following examples are simple and complex directives. 
 
 The sub zone LAN'_A of LAN_A  has not the right to access 
to the FTP server located in LAN_B . 
 The zone LAN_A has not the right to access to the zone 
LAN_B . However, the machine A1 in LAN_A can access to 
LAN_B and the sub zone LAN”_A has the right to access to 
the FTP server located in LAN_B. 
 The machine A2 in LAN_A has not the right to access to the 
sub zone LAN'_B of LAN_B . 
 
 
We note that LAN'_A and LAN”_A have a set M of 
common machines. As follows, a formal definition of the 
above security policy: 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Formal Specification of a Security Policy. 
Let we consider definition domain of SP, partitioned the 
into dom(SP ) = A∈ ∪{accept, deny} SPA. Each set SPA  is 
composed by a set of domains SPAi  of  security directives 
concerning a specific flow from a source sr to a destination 
dt: SPA  = {SPAi  (sr, dt) | 1 ≤ i ≤ l}. Each set SPAi 
represents either the domain of a simple directive, if the 
action of the corresponding condition is A, or the domain 
of a complex directive’s exception, if its action  is Accept  
or else the difference between the domains of the  
condition and the exceptions of a complex directive if its 
main action is A. Formally, SPAi  = {dom(sdi ⇒ Ai) \ 
[dom(ei))]||dom(ei => A); 1 ≤ j ≤ n}. In this case, SPaccept 
= dom(e21 ) ∪ dom(e22 ) and SPdeny = dom(sd1) ∪ dom(sd2) 
\ dom(e21 , e22 ) ∪ dom(sd3 ). For the next section, let we 
consider SDAi  the security element whose domain is SPAi . 
And let SDA be the set of such elements. 
 
2.2  Fixing Security Policy Incoherencies 
First, let we consider EltsA as the set of individual elements 
in SP labeled by the action A. Formally,  EltsA = {sdi ⇒ Ai 
|ei }. For example, in the SP defined in previous  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
section , Eltsdeny = {sd1 , sd2 , sd3 }  and Eltsaccept = {e21 , 
e22 }. Let Before_Ai be the set of  elements in EltsA that 
should have higher priority than that  of eltAi .  Once SP 
specified in expressive enough language, our goal is to 
certify that no contradictions exist within security 
directives. To verify SP coherent, we should determine 
whether SPaccept ∩ SPdeny =  ϕ. In negative cases, this means 
that there exists at least a couple of elements (eltAi , elt
c 
Ai ) 
that impose each contradictory actions for common packets 
involved in their effective domains. Let Conflict be the set 
of such couples. In the security policy given as example in 
section 2.1, we can note that the first two directives are in 
conflict. Particularly, (eltdeny1 , eltaccept2). Indeed, sd1 
indicates that the sub zone LAN'A has not the right to 
access FTP server. Whereas, the set M of machines 
common to LAN'A and LAN”_A  should be authorized  
according to e22 . Once our method outputs these results,  
the administrator should define which of the elements 
should be considered by priority (ie. The common 
machines M have or not the right to access FTP server). 
For instance, if, in our example, the administrator judges 
that this access should be prohibited then  elt deny1 has 
higher priority than elt accept2. The set Before_Ai  is so 
expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, each element SPAi  of SPA  is newly defined as 
follows, SPAi  = dom(eltAi ) \ dom(Before_Ai ). In our case, 
SP accept = dom(e21 ) ∪ dom(e22 ) \ dom(sd1 ) and SP deny = 
dom(sd1 )∪dom(sd2 )\(dom(e21 )∪dom(e22 )\ dom(sd1 )) 
∪ dom(sd3 ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Conformance Properties 
The main goal of this work consists of checking whether a 
distributed FC is conform to a given SP. In this section, we  
define formally this notion.  We consider a finite domain P 
containing all the headers of packets possibly incoming to 
or outgoing from a network. A simple firewall 
configuration (Fn ) is a finite sequence of filtering rules of 
the form Fn = (ri ⇒ Ai )0≤i<m . Each  precondition ri of a 
rule defines a filter for packets of P. The structure of ri is 
described later in Section 5. Until then, we just consider a  
function dom mapping each ri into the subset of P of 
filtered packets. Each right member Ai of a rule of  FC is 
an action defining the behavior of the firewall on  filtered  
packets: Ai ∈ {accept, deny}. If no filtering rule ri  can be 
considered for a specific packet, the default firewall  policy 
will be applied : def (Fn ) ∈ {accept, deny}. This  model 
describes a generic form of FC which are used by  most 
firewall products such as CISCO, Access Control List, 
IPTABLES, IPCHAINS and Check Point Firewall... 
A Path(sr, dt) is an ordered set of firewalls through which 
the traffic flow (sr → dt) could go across : Path(sr, dt) = 
(Fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ N ). Let [[Path(sr, dt)]] be the set of all 
possible paths from sr to dt. 
A distributed FC is conform to a SP if the action defined 
 by SP for each packet p concerning a traffic from sr to dt 
is really undertaken by the distributed firewall. Precisely, 
we distinguish two cases: 
 For each positive security rule SPAi, p should be 
accepted whatever the path to cross. This implies that p 
should be allowed by each firewall Fn belonging to 
each path. 
 For each restrictive security rule SPdi, p should be 
denied whatever the path to cross. This implies that p  
should be denied by at least one firewall Fn belonging  
to each path. 
 
 
Fig 2. Inference System for a SPai 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition 1 (conformance property for Spai) : A  
distributed F C is conform to SPai (sr, dt) iff ∀ p ∈  
dom(SPai (sr, dt)), ∀Pa ∈  [[Path(sr, dt)]] and ∀Fn ∈   
Pa, AFn (p) = accept.  
Definition 2 (conformance property for Spdi) :  A 
distributed F C is conform to SPdi (sr, dt) iff ∀ p ∈  
dom(SPdi (sr, dt)), ∀Pa ∈  [[Path(sr, dt)]], ∃ Fn ∈  Pa, 
AFn (p) = deny. 
AFn (p) represents the action undertaken by the firewall  
Fn for a packet p. It is defined as follows: when def (Fn ) =  
deny, if there exists a rule ri ⇒ a in Fn such that  p ∈  
dom(ri ) \ ∪  j<i dom(rj ), AFn (p) = accept otherwise,  
AFn (p) = deny.  
Let Accn and Denn be respectivelly the set of accepted and 
denied packets by Fn . Accn is defined  in this case as 
follows: Accn = ∪ i (dom(ri ) \ ∪ j<i dom(rj )) with ri ⇒ a. 
By analogy, when def (Fn ) = accept, if there exists a rule 
ri ⇒ d in Fn such that p ∈  dom(ri ) \ ∪ j<i  dom(rj ), AFn (p) 
= deny. Otherwise, AFn (p) = accept. Therefore, Denn is 
defined as follows: Denn =∪ i (dom(ri) \∪ j<i dom(rj)) with ri 
⇒ d. And in each case, Accn and Denn are complementary. 
4. Inference Systems 
We propose, in this section, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the verification of the conformance property 
of a distributed FC to a SP. The conditions are presented 
mainly as inference systems shown in Figure 2 and Figure 
3.  The first inference system in Figure 2 concerns each 
firewall Fn in all paths belonging to [[Path(sr, dt)]], where 
sr and dst represent the source and the destination fields of 
a positive security rule SPai . The rules of the system in 
Figure 2 apply to triples (Fn , D, Ddn ) whose first  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
component Fn is a sequence of filtering rules and whose 
second and third components ,respectively D and Ddn are 
subsets of P. D represents the accumulation of the sets of 
packets filtered by the rules of Fn processed so far.  Ddn 
represents the sets of packets considered by SPai and  not 
filtered by the rules of Fn labeled by positive actions. 
We write C |-SP C’ : C’ is obtained from C by  application 
of one of the inference rules of Figure 2 and  Figure 3 
(note that C’ may be a triple as above or one of success or  
fail) and we denote by |- SP * the reflexive and  transitive 
closure of  |- SP. 
recurcallan and recurcalldn are the main inference rules. 
For the inference system in Figure 1, recurcalldn deals with 
the first filtering rule r ⇒ d of Fn given in the couple. The 
condition for the application of recurcalldn is that the set  
of packets dom(r) filtered by this rule and not handled by 
the previous rules (i.e. not in D) would not intersect the 
domain of SPai . The inference rule recurcallan deals with 
the first filtering rule r ⇒ a of Fn given in the couple. The 
condition for its application is that the default firewall 
policy is deny. It results in excluding the effective part of 
the rule r from the set Ddn . Hence, successful repeated 
applications of recurcalldn and recurcallan ensure that the 
Fn under consideration is conform to SPai. The successn 
rule is applied under two conditions. First,  recurcalldn 
must have been used successfully until all filtering rules 
have been processed (in this case the first component Fn of 
the triple is empty). Second, the set Ddn should be empty if 
the default firewall policy is deny. This  latter condition 
ensures that all the packets accepted by the  security rule 
SPai are also handled by the firewall configuration. There 
are two cases for the application of failuren.  In the first 
case, failuren is applied to a triple (Fn , D, Ddn ) where Fn 
is not empty. It means that recurcalldn has failed on this 
triple and hence that the Fn is not conform to SPai . In this 
case, failuren returns the first filtering rule of Fn as an 
 
Fig 3. Inference System for a SPdi 
 
  
example of rule which is not correct, in order to provide 
help to the user for correcting the FC. In the second case, 
failuren is applied to (ϕ, D, Dn ). It means that successn has 
 failed on this triple and that the Fn is not conform to Spai. 
In this case, Ddn is returned and can be used in order to  
identify packets accepted by the SP and not by the Fn . 
The second inference system in Figure 3 concerns the  first 
firewall Fn for each path belonging to [[Path(sr, dt)]], 
where sr and dst represent the source and the destination 
fields of a restrictive security rule SPdi . The rules of the 
system in Figure 3 apply to triples (Fn , D, Dan ) whose 
first component Fn is a sequence of filtering rules and 
whose second and third components, respectively D and 
Dan are subsets of P. Dan is initialized to ϕ if the default 
policy of  Fn is deny and to Dan−1. Otherwise, relatively to 
the previous firewall number n − 1 belonging to the same 
path. For this inference system, the inference rule 
recurcallan deals with the first filtering rule r ⇒ a of Fn 
given in the couple. The condition for the application of 
recurcallan is that the default firewall policy is deny. It 
results in accumulating the effective part of the rule r to the 
set Dan . The next inference rule, recurcalldn deals with the 
first filtering rule r ⇒ d of Fn given in the couple. The 
condition for the application of recurcalldn is that the 
default firewall policy is accept. It results in excluding the 
effective part of the rule r from the set Dan. The successn 
rule is applied when, first, recurcalldn and recurcallan have 
been used successfully until all filtering rules have been 
processed (in this case the first component Fn of the triple 
is empty). And second, at least one the following 
conditions holds: 
 
 The set Dan is empty if the default firewall policy is 
accept. This condition ensures that the packets 
considered by SPdi but allowed by the (n − 1) previous 
firewalls of the same path are totally denied by Fn. 
 
 
 The intersection of the sets Dan and Dan−1 is empty  if 
the default policy of Fn is deny. This condition 
guarantees that the packets considered by SPdi but 
allowed by the (n − 1) previous firewalls of the same 
path are not allowed by Fn. 
 
The follown rule applies if the conditions of the successn 
rule are not satisfied and the firewall Fn under 
consideration is not the last in the path Pa. Applying this 
rule updates the set Dan of accepted packets passed 
through the n firewalls, although they should be denied 
according to SPdi . The application of failuren is triggered 
when, either, n = |Pa| and (R = Dan ) = ϕ if the default Fn 
policy is accept or  (R = Dan ∩ Dan−1 ) = ϕ, otherwise. 
The two cases mean that the set R of packets will be 
allowed by the chain of firewalls composing the path  Pa, 
which dissent to SPdi . If this inference rule occurs, our 
tool outputs the set R indicating the path Pa under 
consideration to help the user to correct its configuration. 
Let us now prove that the inference systems presented in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 are correct and complete. From now 
on, we assume that  SP is consistent. This implies that ∀ i, 
∀ j, SPdi ∩SPaj = ϕ. 
  Thus, the theorems below deal with generic cases for 
distinct  security  rules SPdi and SPai . 
 
Theorem 1 (correctness):  For  a  SPai (sr, dt), if  ∀Pa ∈ 
[[Path(sr, dt)]] and ∀Fn  ∈  Pa, such that  (Fn , ∅, dom(SPai 
)) |-*Spai   success then the distributed firewall configuration 
FC is conform to SPai . 
 
Proof: If for a SPai (sr, dt), ∀Pa ∈ [[P ath(sr, dt)]] and ∀Fn 
∈ Pa, (Fn , ∅, dom(SPai )) |- ∗ SPai success then we have two 
cases: if def (Fn ) = accept then for all p ∈ Spai, ∀ri ⇒ d, p 
 dom(ri ) \ ∪j<i dom(rj ) through the condition of 
recullcalldn . Hence,  AFn (p) = accept. Second, if def (Fn ) 
= deny, then dom(SPai ) \ ∪i (dom(ri ) \ ∪j<i dom(rj )) = ∅. 
by the application of recullcallan . In this case, for all p ∈ 
dom(SPai ), there exists ri ⇒ a such that p ∈ dom(ri )\∪j<i 
dom(rj). Hence, AFn (p) = accept. Therefore, the distributed 
FC is conform to Spai.  
 
Theorem 2: For a SPdi (sr, dt), if ∀Pa ∈ [[P ath(sr, dt)]] ,∃ 
n ∈ Pa, such that (Fn , ∅, Dan ) |-∗ SPdi  success then the 
distributed firewall configuration FC is conform to SPdi. 
 
Proof: For a SPdi (sr, dt), if ∀Pa ∈ [[P ath(sr, dt)]] and∃F n 
∈ Pa, such that (Fn , ∅, Dan ) |-∗ SPdi  success then Dan−1 
\Denn = ∅ if def (Fn ) = accept or Dan−1 ∩ Accn = ∅, 
otherwise. This guarantees that the set of packets included 
in Dan−1 are totally denied by Fn . Moreover, Dan−1 = 
Dan−2 \Denn−1 if def (Fn ) = accept or Dan−1 = Dan−2 ∩ 
Accn−1, otherwise. Thus, Dan−1 represents in the two cases, 
the set of packets included in Dan−2 and denied by Fn−1 . 
With Da0 = dom(SPdi ), We can easily show by induction 
on n that Dan−1 represents the set of packets belonging to  
dom(SPdi ) and not denied by any of the (n − 1) previous 
firewalls. It implies that dom(SPdi ) ⊆ ∪ (1  i  n) Deni . It 
follows that  ∀p  ∈ dom(SPdi ), ∃Fn , such that AFn (p) = 
deny.  Hence, the distributed firewall is conform to SPdi . 
 
Theorem 3: The distributed  firewall configuration FC  is 
conform  to SPai (sr, dt) iff  ∀Pa ∈ [[Path(sr, dt)]] and ∀Fn 
∈ Pa, (Fn , ∅, dom(SPai ))|- SPai ∗  success. 
 
Proof: The distributed firewall configuration FC is 
conform to SPai (sr, dt) implies that ∀Pa ∈ [[P ath(sr, dt)]], 
∀F n ∈ Pa and ∀p ∈ P, we have p ∈ dom(SPai ) and p ∈ 
Accn . It implies that dom(SPai ) \ Accn = ∅ if def (Fn ) = 
deny. And, ∀ri ⇒ d, dom(ri ) \ ∪j<i dom(rj ) ∩ dom(SPai ) = 
∅, otherwise. Hence, successful repeated applications of 
  
recurcallan and recurcalldn rise to (Fn , ∅, dom(SPai )) |- 
SPai * success. 
 
Theorem 4: The distributed  firewall configuration  FC is 
conform to SPdi (sr, dt) iff ∀Pa ∈ [[Path(sr, dt)]] ∃Fn ∈ Pa, 
such that (Fn , ∅, Dan ) |-∗ SPdi success. 
 
Proof: The distributed firewall configuration FC is 
conform to SPdi (sr, dt) implies that ∀p ∈ dom(SPai ), ∃Fn 
∈ Pa such that p ∈ Denn . It implies that dom(SPdi ) ⊆ ∪ 
(1   i  |<pa|) Deni . As shown in Theorem 2,  this case is 
occurred when (Fn , ∅, Dan ) |-∗ SPdi success is reached. 
 
 Theorem 5: If (Fn , D, Ddn ) |-∗ SPai fail then the 
distributed firewall configuration F C is not conform to 
SPai . 
Proof: Either we can apply iteratively the recurcallan and 
recurcalldn rules starting with (Fn , ∅, SPai ), until we 
obtain (∅, ∪ j<n dom(rj ), Ddn ), or one application of the  
recurcalldn rule fails. In the latter case, there exists (i < n) 
⇒ d such that dom(ri ) \ ∪ j<i dom(rj ) ∩ SPai = ∅. 
Therefore, there exists p ∈ P such that p ∈ dom(ri ) \ ∪j<i 
dom(rj ) and p ∈ SPai . It follows that FC is not conform to 
the security policy SP .  If (Fn , ∅, SPai ) |-∗ SPai (∅, ∪ j<n 
dom(rj ), Ddn ) using recurcallan and recurcalldn but the 
application of the successn rule to the last triple fails, then 
there exists Ddn = ∅ if def (Fn) = deny. It means that 
dom(SPai ) \ Accn = ∅. It follows that ∃p ∈ P, such that p ∈ 
dom(SPai ) and p   Accn . Hence, the distributed firewall 
configuration FC is not conform to the security policy Spai. 
Theorem 6: If (Fn , D, Dan ) |-SPdi* fail then the distributed 
firewall configuration FC is conform to SPdi . 
Proof: If (Fn , D, Dan ) |- SPdi * fail then either Dan = ∅  or 
Dan ∩ Dan−1 = ∅ with n = |Pa|. The two cases occur, as 
shown in Theorem 2, if dom(SPdi )   ∪ (1  i  n) Deni . It 
follows that, ∃p ∈ dom(SPdi ), such that , Fn with AFn (p) = 
deny. Hence, the distributed firewall configuration FC is 
not conform to the security policy SPdi. Since the 
application of the inferences to  (Fn , ∅, dom(SPdai ) and 
(Fn , ∅, Dan ) of respectively the inference systems in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 always  terminate, and the outcome 
can only be success or fail,  it  follows immediately from 
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 that if the firewall configuration 
FC is not conform to either SPai or SPdi , then (Fn , ∅, 
Dai ) |- Spai ∗ fail (completeness of failure). 
 
Fig 4. A Corporate Network 
5. Automatic Verification Tool 
Presenting the above Conformance Properties as 
satisfiability problems permits the automation of the 
verification of the conformance of a distributed FC to a SP. 
For this purpose, we have used a recent satisfiability  
solver modulo theories, Yices [6], in order to describe the 
different inputs and to automate the verification process. 
Yices provides different additional functions, compared to 
simple satisfiability solvers. These functions are based on 
theories like those of arrays, list structures and bit vectors. 
The first input of our verification tool is a set of firewalls. 
Each firewall is composed by a set of filtering rules.  Each 
rule is defined by a priority order and composed of  the 
following main fields: the source, the destination, the  
protocol and the port. The source and destination fields 
correspond to one or more machines identified by an IPv4 
address and a mask coded both on 4 bytes, For example, 
the following expression written in Yices syntax refers to 
the third filtering rule concerning UDP or TCP flow, 
coming from the source network 10.0.0.0/8 and reaching 
the network 192.168.0.0/16 for a destination port 
belonging to the subrange [20 − 60]. 
 
(define r :: (-> int bool))(assert (= (r 3) (and (= ips1 
 10) (= ipd1 192) (= ipd2 168) (>= port 20) 
 (<= port 60) (or (= protocol tcp) (= protocol udp))))). 
 
In order to illustrate the proposed  verification procedure, 
we have chosen to apply our method to a case study of a 
corporate network represented in Figure 4. The network is 
divided into three zones delineated by branches of 
firewalls F1 , F2 , F3 whose initial configurations FC 
corresponds to  the rules in  figure 5 . 
  
Fig 5. Distributed Firewall Configuration 
The security policy SP that should be respected contains 
the following directives. 
 
sd 1 : The zone Z1 has not the right to access to The zone Z3 . 
sd 2 : The zone Z3 has not the right to access to the SSH server 
Z2. 
sd 3 : The zone Z1 has  the right to access to the TELNET server 
Z'3 . 
sd 4 : The zone Z3 has the right to access to the DNS server Z“.2 
sd 5 : The zone Z1 has the right to access to The zone Z2 , except 
to its SSH server Z'2 . 
 
As defined in section 2 , [[Path(sr, dt)]] is the set of all  
possible paths from a source sr to a destination dt. In this  
case, we have : 
         [[Path(Z1 , Z3 )]] ::= {(F1 ), (F1 , F2 , F3 )} 
        [[Path(Z1 , Z2 )]] ::= {(F1 , F2 ), (F1 , F3 , F2 )} 
       [[Path(Z3 , Z2 )]] ::= {(F1 , F2 ), (F3 , F2 )} 
 
5.1 Security Policy Coherence 
As previously mentioned,  we should first check 
whether the security policy is coherent. By implementing 
our verification method using Yices, the  satisfiability 
result obtained is displayed in figure 6. The outcome 
shows that SP is not coherent i.e. that the security 
directives sd1 and sd3 have contradictory actions for 
common packets.  
 
 
 
Fig 6. Checking SP Coherence 
Indeed, the zone Z1 has the right to access to the TELNET 
server according to sd3. Whereas,  sd1 denies this access. 
To fix such incoherence, the administrator could fix which 
of the two elements has higher priority.  For example, let 
we consider that elt_deny1 has higher priority than 
elt_accept1. In this case, sd1 could be replaced by a 
complex directive as follows: 
sd 1 : The zone Z1 has not the right to access to The zone Z3, 
except to its TELNET server . 
5.2 Conformance Verification of positive policies 
Once ensured that SP is coherent, we proceed to the 
verification of the conformance of the distributed FC to 
each positive security rule. The first satisfiability result 
obtained is displayed in figure 7.  The outcome shows that 
the distributed F C is not conform to SP . i.e. that some 
packets that should be accepted according to spa2 are 
denied by the second firewall of the first path of  
[[Path(Z3 , Z2 )]] which is F2. It indicates also, that no rule 
is accepting this  type of traffic. Therefore, these packets 
are denied by the  default firewall policy of F2 (deny). This 
conflict can be resolved by adding a rule at the end of the 
F2 configuration to deploy  SPa2.  
 
 
Fig. 7  Automatic Verification of spa2 
5.2 Conformance Verification of restrictive policies 
After that the conformance property to positive policies 
has been established, we proceed to the verification of the 
distributed F C to the restrictive policies. We obtained the 
satisfiability result displayed in Figure 8. 
 
  
 
Fig. 8  Automatic Verification of spd2 
According to this outcome, the distributed F C is not 
conform according to SPa2 : There are some packets  
handled by SPa2 that will be accepted by crossing the first  
path (F1 , F2 ) until the firewall F2 . The outcome 
indicates also that the second filtering rule of F2 is 
accepting some packets previously  allowed by F1 , which 
is in conflict with the requirements of SPd2 . Indeed, the 
rule F2 (2) implements totally the condition of SPd2 but 
the action considered is accept. This conflict can be 
resolved by changing the later  by deny. We note that 
YICES ensures the conformance of SPa1, SPd1 ,and SPd3. 
Figure 9 presents a correct and complete distributed 
configuration according to the defined SP . 
 
 
Fig 9. A correct and complete distributed Configuration 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we propose a formal and automatic method 
for verifying that a distributed firewall configuration is 
conform to a security policy. Otherwise, the method 
provides key information helping users to correct 
configuration errors. Moreover, we also propose a 
procedure for checking and fixing the coherence of a 
security policy, which is a necessary condition for the 
conformance verification. Finally, our method has been 
implemented using the satisfiability solver modulo theories 
Yices. The experimental results obtained are very 
promising.  
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